Those who have studied the moral intuitions displayed in responding to Trolley Problems have focused on subjects' willingness to cause the death of one party to avert multiple deaths. Here, we explore whether it matters what is being traded off: lives, injuries, or property, for a larger number of lives or injuries, or more valuable property. We find that aggregation -the willingness to sacrifice some party's interests when others will gain more if one does so --is most plainly impermissible when the party is considering trading a smaller for a larger number of deaths, and it is least impermissible when the harmed party is merely injured or loses property to save others' lives. Cases in which the harmed party is injured to save others from injury, or loses property to save more valuable property, are intermediate, closer to the death/death cases. If subjects simply followed either a simple rule that it is impermissible to sacrifice the interests or violate the rights of an individual for the sake of others or a simple rule that they should always seek to maximize aggregate utility, responses to these cases would not be expected to differ; however, responses do differ, which suggests that subjects' judgments are complex and multifaceted.
I.
Background and Introduction
Psychologists and philosophers have long considered both how people actually react, and how they should react, to a series of hypothetical moral problems in which they judge whether it is permissible or even obligatory to take distinct actions that would result in the death of a single party, but also save multiple lives. In this paper, we examine a rarelystudied aspect of these problems: how people might respond differently to situations where the trade-off presented is not between causing one or more deaths to avert still more deaths, but instead implicate other types of sacrifices and aggregate gains. We seek to compare the reactions that people have to trading off one death to avoid multiple deaths to the reactions that they have to making different sorts of intra-categorical trade-offs (a single injury to avert multiple injuries; less valuable property owned by one party for more valuable property owned by others) and cross-category trade-offs (e.g. an injury or property loss suffered by one party to save multiple lives of others.)
By examining people's responses to different types of trade-offs, we can better understand widespread moral intuitions about when it is permissible (or desirable, or even mandatory) to aggregate across persons-i.e. to make a decision that some parties should bear losses so that others might gain more-and when it is impermissible. This issue is central to the debate between deontological and utilitarian thinkers, which (at least in its most classical form) has focused on the following problem: can we sacrifice the interests of some -or even violate unambiguous rights they would ordinarily be deemed to enjoy -if doing so will benefit others or does doing so violate strictures against using people as mere means to an end? While the Trolley Problem and other dilemmas used previously all focus on tradeoffs of lives for lives, people have unambiguous rights other than the right to their life. If people react differently to making, say, injury-injury trade-offs than they do to making death-death trade-offs, it may suggest that certain conceptions of their resistance to aggregating require rethinking. In response to philosophers who, in addressing these problems, often claim they are trying both to describe and then justify widespread moral intuitions [See, e.g. Kamm 1989 , p. 227; Montmarquet, 1982 , p. 440; Thomson, 1985 Thomson, , p. 1395 , our primary goal here is simply to specify in detail what some commonplace intuitions actually are; we do not take a position on whether philosophers either do (see, e.g. Capellan, 2011) or should (see, e.g. Much of the existing philosophical and psychological literature has focused on either justifying or explaining why it is that people will, in conventional Trolley problems, typically think it allowable to aggregate when considering diverting a runaway trolley about to kill five people on to a spur track where it will kill just one but not consider aggregation permissible when considering pushing someone off of a drawbridge to his death to block the same sort of runaway trolley about to kill five. This paper focuses on just one set of variations on these conventional problems, and we do not address or explain people's responses to trading off lives for lives in other variations. Our other work has explored other aspects of people's responses to the Trolley and related problems. 1 In two earlier pieces (Kelman and Kreps, 2012; Kelman and Kreps, 2014), we explored both reactions to the two classic Trolley vignettes and to problems in which parties must judge the permissibility not of killing one party to save others but of taking steps that would save more or fewer parties already in jeopardy (ex post savings cases) or establish programs that would prospectively save more or fewer lives (ex ante savings cases.) The two classic vignettes are: (1) whether to divert a runaway trolley on to a spur track, killing one, to save multiple potential victims on a main track, and (2) whether to push an overweight person off a drawbridge to block the trolley from hitting the potential victims. Subjects typically judge diverting in the first problem permissible and pushing in the second problem impermissible. We first showed that respondents reject Taurek's claim that the number of victims is simply morally irrelevant. Our central novel finding was that the intuition to distinguish the two cases is weaker than the extensive literature emphasizing its significance has implied. Responses to the two problems often converge to a significant extent on the position that aggregation is impermissible in each of the two classic killing cases because
In this paper, we turn to the question of whether it matters what is being traded off: lives, injuries, or property, for a larger number of lives, injuries, or more valuable property. We argue that aggregation is judged to be most plainly impermissible when the party is considering trading a smaller for a larger number of deaths, and least impermissible when the harmed party is merely injured or loses property to save others' lives;; the intermediate cases,
closer to the death/deaths ones, are those in which the harmed party is injured to save others from injury or loses property to save more valuable property. More important than subjects' reactions to each particular type of tradeoff is the finding that reactions to these cases differ at all; they would not be expected to differ if subjects simply followed either a simple rule that it is impermissible to sacrifice the interests or violate the rights of an individual for the sake of others or one that they should always seek to maximize social welfare or aggregate utility. Thus, the finding that reactions do differ reflects the fact that subjects are making moral judgments on a more complex or multi-faceted basis. the intuition to divert is both more weakly held and more subject to revision than the intuition against pushing. For instance, the already weak intuition to divert becomes far less commonplace when the two problems are presented together. Moreover, while the strictures against pushing are typically seen as mandatory (and hold even when following the strictures disadvantages kin or more identified parties), the obligation to divert is rarely unqualifiedly mandatory, and even its permissibility is sensitive to potential harm to kin and identifiable people. At the same time, we find that intuitions against aggregating in both pushing and diverting cases are far more fragile than most philosophers and psychologists who study these dilemmas recognize. The intuition that subjects display that proves far most basic and durable is that aggregation is plainly permissible, often desirable, but rarely completely mandatory when one is contemplating sacrificing the opportunity to save one or more persons in order to save still more. This is true both in situations in which one must allocate ex post life-saving resources and those in which one must make decisions, ex ante, to choose programs that will result in fewer, rather than more, deaths in the future, even when the identity of those upon whom an increased risk of death is imposed is known when the initial program is proposed. In a forthcoming piece, we expect to explore demographic and attitudinal determinants of responses, taking advantage of the fact that unlike psychologists who have typically tested responses in lab settings, using relatively homogenous subjects, we are using "polling" data in most of our experimental conditions and therefore have lots of both demographic information and variation. The primary question we will address in the last paper is whether responses to the problems we pose are universal, non-universal but fundamentally randomly distributed across persons, or are affected by the sorts of demographic or ideological factors that typically influence attitudes towards public policy questions. We do not however discuss the possibility that responses are a function of cognitive styles [Bartels, 2008, To make an additional, more specific point, we also present evidence that, when judging the permissibility of trading off one party's property loss for other parties' more extensive property losses, subjects modestly distinguish between cases in which we could protect the injured party with a "property rule" (forbidding inflicting the loss) and a "liability rule"
(compensating him for the loss which may permissibly be inflicted in the first instance).
When the injured party will lose fungible rather than unique and irreplaceable property, so that compensation is more likely to be adequate, subjects are modestly more willing to tolerate the initial sacrifice of the injured party's property.
II. An Overview of Basic Hypotheses and Experimental Methods
A. Hypotheses 1. Cross-category trades are evaluated as though intra-personal
Our first hypothesis was that subjects would be far more willing to aggregate across persons in situations where, were the trade-off intra-personal rather than an inter-personal, one would plainly inflict the damage on oneself to avoid "greater" damage to oneself. We expected that people would be substantially more prone to accept aggregation, for instance, if the "victim" breaks a leg and the "winners" avoid death, recognizing that a single person choosing between a broken leg and her own death would unambiguously choose the broken leg. In other words, we hypothesized that most subjects feel that the case for harming one victim's interests to help others is far stronger when it is possible to make a comparative social welfare calculation even without making reference to the numbers (even though doing so arguably violates the most rigid strictures against using someone as a means). We thus hypothesized that more subjects would conclude that it is permissible to make one party sustain a broken leg (or lose property) to save lives than would conclude that it is permissible to kill a single party to save multiple lives.
2. Conventional injury method distinctions (e.g. spur track v. footbridge) still apply
We hypothesized that the conventional distinctions that subjects make between diverting and pushing cases when considering killing one to save multiple lives would still be present even when considering harming a relatively "minor" interest to protect a more important one. Thus, for instance, we predicted that more subjects would think it permissible to divert the train, breaking one victim's leg to save five lives on the main track, than would find it acceptable to push someone off the drawbridge, breaking his leg, to save five from death.
3. Intra-categorical trades: death is special
While we were fairly confident in our initial hypothesis about the permissibility of crosscategory trades that impose a relatively trivial loss to ensure manifestly larger gains for others, we were less confident in our expectation that death/deaths trade-offs would be special. We tentatively predicted that fewer people would find it permissible to kill someone to save multiple lives than would find it permissible to injure someone to save multiple parties from injury, or than would find it permissible to destroy one party's property to save more valuable property owned by others from destruction.
Sensitivity to the nature of the entitlement
We hypothesized that parties would be more willing to sacrifice one party's property to save another party's more expensive property if the property to be destroyed was essentially fungible, and its owner could therefore receive completely adequate compensation for its loss, than if the sacrificed property were non-fungible. Though we did not expect subjects to conceptualize their intuitions in conventional legal terms, we believed that they would feel more comfortable protecting a party holding fungible property with a liability rule (permitting another party to harm the rights bearer's interests when doing so helps the damaging party a great deal, so long as he compensates the rights bearer for his losses) rather than a property rule (permitting the rights bearer to prevent the destruction of his property absolutely, regardless of the consequences of so doing and disregarding the possibility of compensation).
B. Methods and findings
Methods
We had two waves of data collection. In each, participants read and responded to prompts based on conventional Trolley problems. In the first round of data collection, we used a total of 12 prompts (described in Respondents then judged whether the action contemplated by the actor in the prompt was permissible or impermissible. Those who said an action was permissible were then asked to judge whether the action was "barely permissible (a close question)," "probably permissible," or "absolutely permissible." Those who judged it impermissible then were asked whether it was barely impermissible, probably impermissible, or absolutely impermissible. We used the dichotomous permissible/impermissible response as our main dependent measure, and we also recoded the second responses on a six point scale from 1 (absolutely impermissible) to 6
(absolutely permissible).
The prompts varied the method by which the injury, death, or damage would occur. In three prompts (Hank, James, and Lewis), subjects were asked whether the vignette character should divert the trolley from the main track onto a Spur Track, while in the nine other prompts, subjects were asked whether the vignette character should push some person (Ian, Ken, Mike, Richard, and Zach) or some object (Carter, Clay, Cliff, and Craig) off of the Drawbridge to block the runaway Trolley's progress. Across the twelve scenarios, we varied: (1) Table 2 . These subjects responded to the same permissibility questions for each of 2 The actor whose decision the respondents are asked to evaluate is considering killing a party to save multiple lives in Hank, Ian and Zach; considers injuring a party to avert multiple injuries in James, Ken, and Richard; and considers causing one injury to avert five deaths in Louis and Mike. The actor considers destroying non-fungible property to save property with a higher market value in Carter; destroy non-fungible property to avert a death in Cliff; considers destroying fungible property to save more valuable property in Clay, and considers destroying fungible property to avoid deaths in Craig. In Zach and Richard, the party considering pushing someone off the Drawbridge to avoid deaths and injuries respectively considers classic arguments that the usual intuition against pushing someone to block the Trolley is incorrect, because parties who did not know whether they would be on the main track or the bridge would typically agree, in advance, that one life be sacrificed to save five since making that agreement would maximize each person's chance of survival.
the prompts. To avoid anchoring effects, we presented prompts in random order in all multiprompt settings. Responses in multi-prompt settings are reported in Table 2 below.
One hundred subjects responded to what we call Six Prompts (Table 2 , Six Prompts column). These subjects read scenarios in which a person might divert the train on to the spur track killing one to avoid five deaths (Hank prompt, Tables 1 and 2 ), injuring one to avoid five injuries (James prompt, Tables 1 and 2 ), or injuring one to avoid five deaths (Louis prompt, Tables 1 and 2) , and Drawbridge scenarios with the same three trade-offs (Ian, Ken, Mike prompts, Tables 1 and 2 ).
Subjects responding to the Eight Prompts setting (Eight Prompts, Table 2 ) saw both those same six prompts and two additional prompts (City Council and George) that called on them to judge decisions that a vignette character might make to save more rather than fewer people. In George (Table 2) , subjects were asked to make a decision about allocating scarce medicine: they were asked if they thought it permissible for a doctor to give small doses to each of the people who would be saved if given those small doses, knowing that ten people would be saved while only one would be saved if the doctor made the alternative decision, giving all the medicine to the one patient who required a far larger than typical dose. In the City Council prompt (Table 2) , we shifted decision making from individuals to a group and asked subjects to judge whether a City Council's decision to approve a road safety improvement project that would save more lives than an alternative road safety improvement project was permissible. (In our earlier papers, we report data from subjects who were asked as well whether it was mandatory or preferable. See A separate group of subjects responded to the same eight prompts, but with a twist: these respondents were asked to think of (and to give us modest information about) a person whose moral perspective they admired, and then to answer how they believed this person-rather than the subjects themselves-would judge the permissibility of taking the steps each of the characters in the eight prompts was considering (Eight Prompts + perspective of admired person, Table 2 ). Finally, subjects responding to the Twelve Prompt setting ( Table 2 , Twelve Prompts column), subjects encountered both the same six basic prompts as in the Six Prompts treatment, as well as six others. Four of these were variations that highlighted conventional objections to aggregation-e.g., the fact that that the victim who is sacrificed to save others (by being either pushed off the drawbridge or run over on the spur track) would not consent to that course of action being taken (Ted, Paul, Roger), or the fact that the person considering pushing might not be obliged to give his own life to save those in peril (Sam). In two additional prompts, either the party who would be killed by diverting or the parties who would be saved by pushing were more thickly identified (i.e., given a name and a brief story) than the parties who would be saved by diverting or killed by pushing (Nat and Oliver).
3 It is possible that people, in responding to these dilemmas, have systematic biases, in the sense that they themselves would acknowledge that their responses are affected by factors that they would also admit are not appropriate determinants of responses. One way to assess people's beliefs about what their responses to these dilemmas ought to be, rather than simply what their responses are, is to present multiple dilemmas simultaneously, thus highlighting some of their underlying features and forcing people to consider the relationships between different responses as well as each individual response. As we demonstrated in our first paper, the way in which presenting multiple prompts affects responses to individual prompts is very sensitive to the set of prompts that is presented together. Another way of investigating whether people believe their own responses are the best ones is to ask them what a moral hero, an exemplar of moral goodness, would decide. Differences between people's own responses and those they believe morally superior others would give may be attributed to personal weakness of will, or to the influence of emotions that upon further reflection should not play a role in decisions. In other words, asking people to consider the perspective of someone they consider morally excellent should encourage them to consider what the best response to the dilemma would be, thus overriding factors that upon further reflection might seem inappropriate.
To recruit participants, we used two survey methods, each approved for use in this study by the Stanford Institutional Review Board. First, for most prompts, we used a formal, conventional Internet political polling survey method, via the polling firm Polimetrix/yougov.
Our participants were among 1.5 million United States residents, recruited using methods that help ensure diversity in the panel, who signed up in advance to participate in surveys sent by the firm, and who volunteered to participate in our particular survey in exchange for points from the firm that could be redeemed for "prizes." Our experimental prompts were sent to a random subset of these volunteers, until we generated 100 responses to each experimental prompt, balanced for gender; as soon as 50 females or 50 males had responded to a particular prompt, no more respondents of that gender could respond to the prompt. 4 In Tables 1 and 2 , in which we report summary data, all prompts for which responses were elicited through Polimetrix/yougov are labeled with the parenthetical (P).
Other prompts were presented to participants signed up for a national web survey pool maintained by the Stanford Graduate School of Business. This participant pool is open to English-speaking adults of all races and ethnic backgrounds; no restrictions were placed on the distribution of different demographic groups who could sign up to complete the surveys. In exchange for participating, participants were entered in a drawing to win one of several gift cards to an online retailer. Surveys conducted using the Stanford GSB website are reported in Table 1 with a parenthetical (B).
The experiments were conducted in December 2009 and October 2010 (the experiments labeled P) and from February to October 2011 (the experiments labeled B). For all the tests performed for this study using Polimetrix prompts, our target sample size was 100, as shown in Table 1 , but a few prompts achieved sample sizes of 98 or 99 due to the failure of a respondent 4 A sample set of instructions and prompt is in Appendix A. The full text of each prompt is available on-line.
or respondents to answer the relevant questions. For the GSB site prompts, our target minimum sample size for the prompts reported in this paper was 50, but due to the software's uneven random assignment of participants to conditions (and the fact that we were running other
conditions concurrently), we ended up with more than 50 before we closed the survey. In treatments that allowed participants to respond to more than one prompt, we used statistical methods that accounted for the nonindependence of multiple observations of the same participant. Analyses were performed using R software (R Core Team, 2013).
2b. Findings
We report the findings relevant to our first three hypotheses in Table 1 . All data summarized in this table are from subjects exposed to only a single prompt. The first cell in each row identifies the prompt by name (e.g. Hank) and indicates whether the sample was gathered through the conventional political polling methods [e.g. Hank (P)] or the Stanford GSB website [e.g. Carter (B)]. We then give a very brief description of the issue raised in the scenario: for instance, in Hank (P) subjects judged the permissibility of diverting the train to save five lives, while killing one and in Carter(B) subjects judged the permissibility of pushing a one-of-a-kind object with a modestly low market value off the drawbridge to save far more expensive property from being destroyed, in a situation in which the unique object's owner manifests signs that he would not consent to having that done.
The next column summarizes subjects' responses: the percentage of subjects who gave the aggregative response (i.e., who think the proposed action permissible) and the percentage who gave the anti-aggregative response (i.e. who think the action impermissible), as well as the sample size. We also report the mean response on a 6 point scale (from 1, absolutely impermissible, to 6, absolutely permissible.) Hypotheses One and Two: As hypothesized, subjects were generally far more willing to aggregate across persons in situations where, were the trade-off an intra-personal rather than an inter-personal one, one would plainly inflict the damage on oneself to avoid "greater" damage.
People were prone to accept aggregation, for instance, if the "victim" breaks a leg and the "winners" avoid death (94% accepted this tradeoff in the Louis condition), recognizing that a single person choosing between a broken leg and her own death would unambiguously choose the broken leg. In other words, subjects appear to have had an easier time permitting an actor to harm one person's interests to help others when they could make a comparative social welfare calculation even without making reference to the numbers; 5 a broken leg is clearly less bad than a death (or deaths) from any agent's vantage, but it is less clear that a single death is less bad 5 This is true even though, as we reported in the first article in this series, subjects unambiguously believe that as a general matter, "the numbers count." They not only believe it is permissible but preferable to choose to allocate scarce medicine to a large number of people who need small dosages rather than a single person who needs all of the medicine (and believe this even when explicitly alerted to the argument, first raised by Taurek (Taurek, 1977) , that allocating the medicine in this fashion means that some individuals are given a higher chance of survival than others) and to rescue a larger group of potential drowning victims rather than a single one if they have a chance to do only one of the two. They are also far more prone to believe it permissible to divert the train on to the spur track, killing the person on the spur track, when doing so will save more people than will die than when they will save just one on the main track. And they believe that public bodies should choose safety projects that save more, not fewer lives, even when we can broadly identify groups of people who are more likely to be benefitted and more likely to be hurt by the choice of one safety project rather than another. This appears to have been true especially when the ordinary deontological constraints on harming are relatively weak (e.g. when subjects judge the permissibility of diverting the train rather than pushing someone to block it), but was even true when these constraints were stronger.
Thus, in the basic Louis condition, when asked whether it was permissible to divert the train (violating no widely accepted deontological side constraints) when doing so would injure one (breaking his leg) and save five lives, only 6% of respondents gave the strong anti-aggregative response (no one's interests may ever be sacrificed for the sake of others), while 94% found aggregation permissible. In Mike, the same trade-off but involving breaking the Fat Man's leg by pushing him off a bridge, a sizeable minority of subjects endorsed aggregation even in the presence of deontological side constraints: 41% would more willingly sacrifice one broken leg to prevent five legs from being broken than would willingly cause one death to avoid five deaths or accept the loss of cheaper property owned by one party in order to save more expensive property owned by another. Each of these trade-offs, though, raises distinct concerns.
Though we initially hypothesized that considerably more subjects would be willing to trade an injury for injuries than a death for deaths, the data did not unambiguously support this hypothesis, and any effect is certainly not large. Clearly, in a between-subjects comparison, i.e. among subjects exposed only to single prompts, responses to these two sorts of problems did not in Zach thought it permissible to push to save lives, and 17% in Richard thought it permissible to push to save legs (p = .553 by Fisher's exact test). There were also no significant differences in the scaled six-point permissibility scores for these three contrasts (using Mann-Whitney U tests, Zs < 1).
The multi-prompt conditions, on the other hand, confirmed our intuition that death is somewhat special, though the effects were modest. When, in a within-subjects design, subjects simultaneously responded both to problems involving injury/injuries trades and to ones involving death/death trades, they were significantly (though not dramatically) more prone to aggregate in the injury/injuries cases. Across the four multi-prompt conditions, the Hank (divert/death/deaths) v. James (divert/injury/injuries) gap was 5%, 13%, 10% and 1%, an overall significant gap (McNemar's (1) = 8.477, p = .004); similarly, in the same four multi-prompt conditions, the gap between Ian (push/death/deaths) and Ken (push/injury/injuries) was 5% 10%, 13%, and 10%);; also a significant gap (McNemar's (1) = 16.695, p < .001). Thus, when subjects saw death/deaths problems alongside problems involving different sorts of intra-categorical tradeoffs-forcing them to focus on the possibility that the death/death problems might be special-substantial numbers do indeed think they are special.
Returning to single-prompt (between-subject) settings, the results for intra-categorical property/property tradeoffs were similar to, though modestly more pro-aggregative, than either death/deaths or injury/injuries tradeoffs. Strikingly, as when trading an injury for injuries, people exposed to single prompts were not significantly more willing than in the death/deaths case to push one party's relatively cheap property to save another's party's more expensive property unless they believed that the property to be destroyed was fungible, and thus that its owner would likely be adequately compensated with money or might indeed consent to its destruction (perhaps knowing he could be adequately compensated). In Carter, subjects were asked to judge the permissibility of pushing a unique but only modestly expensive motorcycle off of the bridge to save property worth a good deal more, in a situation in which the owner plainly considered but rejected sacrificing his motorcycle; here, 27% of respondents thought it permissible, an only mildly (and not statistically significantly) higher proportion than believed it permissible to push someone to his death to save five lives (18% in Ian; p = .173 by Fisher's exact test).
Hypothesis Four: Examining property/property tradeoffs also presented an opportunity to examine subjects' sensitivity to certain distinctions that might seem intuitively relevant, namely, commensurability and consent. As predicted, more subjects thought that aggregation is The finding that it mattered to subjects whether the injured party lost fungible property or unique property was not that unambiguous, though. There was only a small, statistically insignificant distinction between responses to Craig (push a fungible cycle from the drawbridge to prevent five deaths) and Cliff (push a unique, non-fungible cycle to save five from dying in a situation in which the cycle's owner manifests lack of consent), an unsurprising finding given that an overwhelming proportion of respondents already accept aggregation in the case in which they are less disposed to permit him. 89% thought it permissible for Craig to push and 83% Moreover, if we compare Carter and Clay to one another, we find that subjects differentiated to a slight and not statistically significant degree based on the whether the property was fungible (Clay: yes;; Carter;; no) and the salience of the owner's non-consent (Clay: not highlighted; Carter; highlighted): 27% still thought it permissible to push unique property, which the owner would not consent to destroying, off the drawbridge, compared to 36% who thought it permissible to push non-unique property of the same market value. While this modest difference was not statistically reliable given this small sample size (p = .280 by Fisher's exact test), it would be useful to try to replicate the effect with a larger sample size.
Discussion
Our investigation of people's intuitions about different kinds of tradeoffs yielded three statistically and theoretically significant empirical findings: (a) When different kinds of outcomes are being traded off, subjects were willing to trade milder sorts of losses for worse ones, as though they had been ignoring the numbers and considering the tradeoff in an intrapersonal setting; (b) Death is somewhat special (though not as special as we had initially predicted it would be): subjects believed aggregation was less permissible in death/deaths tradeoffs than other situations where similar categories of outcomes are at stake for all parties, but only in a within-subjects multi-prompt setting where the specialness of death may have been especially salient; (c) Subjects believed it was more acceptable to destroy one person's fungible property to save another's more expensive property, compared to destroying unique property of the same market value. Each finding is interesting in its own right-each refines our understanding of people's actual intuitions about the permissibility of aggregating or tolerating that some will bear losses so that others will gain-but each also raises questions about the roots of the observed intuitions. Why do people have these beliefs?
First, why are people more prone to tolerate individual losses when others will suffer worse losses than when others will suffer the same kind of loss? Perhaps people have adopted, whether self-consciously or not, a position close to that advocated by Scanlon, who argued for a Relative
Complaint Model of the following general form: in assessing whether some action is permissible, one should assess it from the vantage point of someone who has discovered that she is the most seriously injured by the action and determine whether she could reasonably reject the action. She could justifiably reject the proposed action so long as the harm that befalls her is (nearly) as bad or worse than the harm that befalls others, even if there are many others and just one of her; she can reject it because there are alternative social institutions in which she is not uniquely badly hurt. She does not have a valid complaint, though, if she is being asked to suffer an injury that is not as bad as an injury that would inevitably befall others even if the decision she complained about were altered (Scanlon, 1998 ). It is not clear, though, that Scanlon's "principle" is any more psychologically or philosophically basic, causal or explanatory than the intuition it is designed to illuminate; whether it indeed follows from what might be described as more basic commitments to contractarian methods that might or might not themselves be grounded in more basic principles about the inviolability of individuals is a complex philosophical question we do not address here.
Alternatively, perhaps this intuition is better explained by people's hesitation to construct a social welfare function that implies the existence of a fictitious aggregate or collective entity.
Such a social welfare function is necessary if we are counting numbers, but a broken leg is (arguably) less bad than a death for any individual; thus, perhaps, we need not construct a fictitious collective being to say that something worse has happened when a death (let alone multiple deaths) occurred than when a leg was broken. Again, the argument may match the intuition, but it is hardly logically compelling or necessarily causal: from whose vantage point is "a" death worse than "a" broken leg? If the only reasonable vantage point is the vantage point of each particular individual, then "your" death is not unambiguously worse than "my" broken leg.
(See Taurek, 1977, for a far richer argument that there is no morally salient entity from whose vantage point multiple deaths are worse than a single death, and by extension, a death is worse than an injury, but just distinct individuals with distinct interests.)
It is also possible, though, to argue that people are willing to resolve these issues by making utilitarian calculations, but only when gains and losses are readily compared. They are, in this sense, not so much against aggregation as they are wary about making comparisons when gains and losses are not readily commensurable. While one might think, at first blush, that those who wanted to compare gains and losses would believe that it would always be worse for a bad event to occur five times than one, even if one could not evaluate how bad any single version of the event was, there are two reasons to think people do not believe this to be the case. First, if a person believes that each death is of infinite "disvalue," then it is uncertain whether five deaths is worse than one, since multiplying "infinity" may not yield a meaningfully larger number.
Second, imagine that that the subject believes that the value of an injury experienced by an individual (like a broken leg) is not really readily reduced to a cardinal value (in dollars, in lost "utils," etc.) and may vary widely across individuals;; it once more becomes ambiguous whether five times an unknown number is larger than another unknown number (though plainly if we believe the six affected people were all randomly selected in terms of their evaluative metrics, chances would be high that the five would suffer more than a single person with atypically high sensitivity to the injury.). People may nonetheless think certain forms of cross-categorical ordinal judgments are easy (deaths are worse than broken legs; deaths and serious injuries are worse than property losses) and willingly make utilitarian calculations only when this is the case.
Our findings also help to clarify the intuitions behind within-category trades: in particular, they contradict Greene's earlier views that the hesitancy to push the Fat Man is triggered exclusively by an emotional response to up close and personal violence (Greene et attenuated, yet most subjects still refused to aggregate.
Of course, if indeed people adopt a "principle" against simple rights violation, our findings on cross-category tradeoffs also suggest that they adopt a limitation that such (prima facie) violations may be justified-and hence permitted, all things considered-at least when the benefits are of a different, and more privileged, form than the costs (lives, not injuries; lives, not property), rather than merely a higher quantity of formally similar benefits (more lives, more injuries, higher valued property). It is also possible that people broadly sympathetic to deontological principles are willing to qualify adherence to those principles in exceptional cases, where the losses that will be borne absent the violation of a principle seem exceptionally disproportionate to the gains from adhering to the more general principle, and that cross-category trade-offs of the sort we presented seem exceptional enough to warrant qualifying deontological rules. 7 Still, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that trade-offs across categories are treated systematically differently.
Turning now to the second finding: why would deaths be special, with intra-categorical trade-offs involving deaths eliciting different reactions? There were several reasons why we hypothesized initially that the hesitation to kill to avert deaths, not injure to avert injuries, would be especially powerful, and any or all of these could explain our finding. First, to the extent that 7 We did not test whether subjects were predisposed to permit a character to push someone off the drawbridge if that would save not just five lives -arguably, only a modest utility gain -but rather tens or hundreds or thousands of millions of lives. If all that is at stake in the injury/deaths cases is some mixture of clarity and gross disproportion in making the utility calculation, we would expect injury/deaths and death/ultra-high deaths cases to come out the same.
people are acting as utilitarian calculators, whether in judging that the circumstances justify overriding prior deontological intuitions against aggregation or because they believe action is always permitted when the positive consequences outweigh the costs, they might find it easier to perform these cost-benefit calculations when comparing the value of one versus five broken legs rather than one versus five deaths. As mentioned above, subjects might well believe that each death is of infinite disvalue (and, correlatively, that it is meaningless to multiply infinity by the number of times an infinitely bad event has occurred); this may be especially true if they think about their own deaths when they think of the death of the putative victim. (In a sense, what they are thinking is "nothing could be any worse than my death" -even if it might be as bad --and identifying with the single person whose life will be sacrificed when contemplating killing a particular person.) At the same time, they may think people devalue broken legs in a more conventional, commensurable way. The possibility that commensurability is a precondition for aggregation was also tested in conditions presenting trade-offs between low-valued and highervalued property.
Second, one could believe that death is special in a different sense. Anti-aggregative feelings based simply on the separateness of persons -without regard to more nuanced distinctions in whether a person is "used" as a means to an end (such as the Doctrine of Double Effect) -are arguably triggered much more strongly in relationship to death. Because death is world-ending for the individual who dies, we could not imagine a long-term set of practices in which we each agreed to suffer losses now through the adoption of some social practice on the assumption that we would gain from some other instantiation of the same social practice if the social practice we were asked to consent to involved our own certain death.
8 8 Of course, as Rakowski notes, it might make sense ex ante for everyone to contract to be killed if their death will save five lives so long as they do not know at the time that they make the contract whether they will be one of the Of course, while our deaths may seem the most important thing imaginable to us personally, they are also, as mainstream existentialist psychology suggests, entirely trivial from a more global perspective. Utilitarian calculations about death, then, trigger this powerful sense of existential dread and anxiety; they emphasize the triviality of our deaths in the context of a world full of people, each of whom simply comes and goes, and make us feel silly or small for our more powerful emotional reaction that our death is incomparably important. This sense of dread, and perhaps the sense of conflict that accompanies it, may lead people to draw on different moral rules when considering trade-offs involving deaths compared to trade-offs with other sorts of outcomes.
Finally, how should we understand why people seem to tolerate the destruction of fungible property to save more expensive property more readily than unique property of equal value? This finding perhaps suggests that commensurability may play an important role in moral judgments of permissibility. Commensurability matters first because we cannot follow an injunction to maximize utility unless we can evaluate the consequences that will arise from our actions; if there is no way of saying that five deaths are worse in welfare terms than one (or perhaps even that five injuries are worse than one, at least as compared to the ease of valuing five, or the party whose life is sacrificed. Doing so will reduce the probability that one will experience "worldending" death. But at the moment at which information is revealed -e.g. when the trainman must decide whether to divert the Trolley or not, choosing to kill either the single person on the Spur Track or the five on the main trackthe person on the Spur Track knows he would not consent on the hope that he will ultimately gain if the decision to divert will be followed from this day forward as a rule. In relationship to injury, though (like a broken leg), one can imagine that someone would agree even when he knows that the decision maker is about to hurt him that he ought to be hurt, so long as the decision to hurt him instantiates a rule that will be prospectively followed in all cases, so that over the course of the rest of his life he will experience fewer injuries. Now the acceptance of injury/rights violation in the particular case may arise from a mixed set of reactions: injury can be borne (while death cannot) and we may think that injurious decisions are so frequent (compared to those that cause death) that it is worth adopting a rule to reduce the rate of harm that one experiences only in the injury case. One could also give a plausible, thogh unsupported, evolutionary biological account of this intuition: if we treat an individual's goal as gene replication, individuals might never accept their own death, but might embrace stable mutual sacrifice norms that reduced suffering during their own lifetimes without ever compromising their ability to reproduce. (It remains unclear, of course, why the norm that would emerge requires consent at the moment when the identity of winners and losers is known rather than at the moment at which a stable social practice emerges.
property worth $5000 rather than $10,000 dollars), it is of no moment to say that one seeks to maximize social welfare. This interpretation can also explain why subjects were more hesitant to destroy unique goods than fungible ones: while the market value of a fungible good may properly reflect the cost of destroying it -even if the owner values it more than its market value, he can find a replacement just like it that he will value just as much more than its market valuethe hedonic losses associated with the destruction of unique goods is much harder to know, since the owner may have valued it far more than its market value.
Commensurability matters more in our view in distinguishing between liability and property rules, and our findings therefore suggest that this distinction may matter in judging the Still, our findings suggest that participants do not apply this distinction in every situation;
as noted earlier, our data only ambiguously support the idea that people willingly violate conventional property rights to save more expensive property because property owners are adequately protected by a liability rule (i.e. that they would consent if they could to destruction of their property to save others as long as they were compensated adequately). Also, we find no support for the idea that the fungible/non-fungible property distinction applies when people consider sacrificing property to save lives, in part of course because the overwhelming majority of people will sacrifice either sort of property to save lives.
Conclusion
Some analyses of the Trolley Problem and other trade-off dilemmas have proposed that aggregative calculations are never permissible, that it is always wrong to sacrifice the interests or, more narrowly, either to violate the rights of an individual for the sake of others or to injure them when the injury is not merely a known side-effect of the beneficial action. We find, however, that people clearly do not follow any such simple rules in evaluating trade-off decisions: for example, they are more willing to injure or destroy the property of one party, compared to permitting a single party to die, to avert multiple deaths. While hardly surprising, this finding is not unimportant in understanding moral intuitions about utilitarianism and deontology because it suggests that people cannot simply be using these sorts of straightforward aggregative or anti-aggregative principles.
Additional complications are suggested by the less obvious finding that subjects are more willing to sacrifice property to save more valuable property or an injury to save multiple injuries than to sacrifice a life to save many lives. This finding reflects certain special features of our relationship with death, and it may suggest more broadly that perceptions that outcomes can be readily evaluated using commensurable measures are an important pre-requisite to the acceptance of utilitarianism.
Additionally, the fact that subjects appear to be more willing to sacrifice fungible than unique property to save more expensive property not only reinforces the finding that utilitarian intuitions require commensurability of end-states but may also reflect an unconscious use of distinctions between protecting entitlements with property rules that bar interference with an owner's interests and liability rules that permit interference so long as the owner receives compensation after the fact for the losses that interference caused. 
